Bending the Third Rail
Because We Should, We Can, We Do
Monday, January 29, 2007
Digby has a very good piece up today about how wacko Cheney has become. I've said before and I'll stand by it, I think Cheney has a serious mental/medical condition. But that's not Digby's point. The point is the simple minded strategy being pursued in Iraq.

One portion that I found interesting was this snippet from Gen. William Odom's testimony before the Senate:
Several critics of the administration show an appreciation of the requirement to regain our allies and others' support, but they do not recognize that withdrawal of US forces from Iraq is the sine qua non for achieving their cooperation. It will be forthcoming once that withdrawal begins and looks irreversible. They will then realize that they can no longer sit on the sidelines. The aftermath will be worse for them than for the United States, and they know that without US participation and leadership, they alone cannot restore regional stability. Until we understand this critical point, we cannot design a strategy that can achieve what we can legitimately call a victory.

Any new strategy that does realistically promise to achieve regional stability at a cost we can prudently bear, and does not regain the confidence and support of our allies, is doomed to failure. To date, I have seen no awareness that any political leader in this country has gone beyond tactical proposals to offer a different strategic approach to limiting the damage in a war that is turning out to be the greatest strategic disaster in our history
Wiser words may not have been said in quite awhile.

I italized the terms strategic and tactical because Odom actually uses them correctly here. To change strategy by beginning withdrawal and drawing in the regional actors who have far more to lose is spot on. Most suggestions on changes, particularly Bush's and Cheney's, have been nothing but a tactical change to a strategy that has already proven to have failed.

Unfortunately, until these meglomaniacs who define strategy from a basis of a fear of looking like a wimpy-ass homo-sexual are gone, this is the policy we have.

Update: Just after posting, I ran across this blast from the past via The Cunning Realists:
The collapse in the South, the one force which the American leaders could not control, continued unabated. The Americans had always had the illusion that something might turn it around; a new leader in South Vietnam who would understand how to get with the program; a realization on the part of the South Vietnamese that their necks were on the line, that the feared enemy (the Americans' feared enemy, though perhaps not the feared enemy of the Vietnamese), the Communists, were about to walk into Saigon. Or magically, the right battalion commander would turn up to lead ARVN battalions into battle against the Vietcong, or the right program would emerge, blending arms and pig-fatteners together to make the peasants want to choose our side. But nothing changed, the other side continued to get stronger, the ARVN side weaker. One reason the principals were always surprised by this, and irritated by the failure of their programs, was that the truth of the war never entered the upper-level American calculations; that this was a revolutionary war, and that the other side held title to the revolution because of the colonial war which had just ended. This most simple fact, which was so important to the understanding of the political calculations...entered into the estimates of the American intelligence community and made them quite accurate. But it never entered into the calculations of the principals, for a variety of reasons; among other things to see the other side in terms of nationalism or as revolutionaries might mean a re-evaluation of whether the United States was even fighting on the right side. In contrast, the question of Communism and anti-Communism as opposed to revolution and antirevolution was far more convenient for American policy makers.

David Halberstam, The Best and the Brightest, pp. 462-463.